AnalysisoffiscaldecentralizationonlocalpublicexpenditurestructureandCountermeasuresAbstract:TheimplementationoffiscaldecentralizationinChina’smodernizationdriveofChinahasmadegreatcontributions,butalsograduallyexposedtomanyoftheproblemsthispaperfocusesonlocalpublicexpenditureatthisstagetheproblemsanddrawbacks,analyzetheirimpactfiscaldecentralizationoutstandingproblems,heattachedimportancetotheconstructionofareasonablelivelihoodtoadjusttheproportionoffinancialexpenditure,comprehensiveofficialexaminationsystem,centralandlocalgovernmentsandotherappropriateseparationofpowersbetweenthereasonablemeasurestomakelocalpublicexpenditurestructureismorereasonableandeffective.Keywords:fiscaldecentralizationofpublicexpenditureofeconomicdevelopmentI.IntroductionFiscaldecentralizationisthattheCentralGovernmenttogivelocalgovernmentstherightto1certaintaxandexpenditureresponsibility,allowlocalgovernmentstodecideonitssizeandstructureofbudgetexpenditures.Thissystemenablesthegovernmentatthelocalleveloffreedomtochoosethetypeofpolicytheyneed,andactivelyparticipateinsocialmanagement,toenablelocalgovernmentstoprovidemoreandbetterservices.20Sincethe1980s,bothdeveloped,developingortransitioncountries,markingtheextentofdecentralizationofthefederalsystemareinagrowthindexofthestate,leadtothedecentralizationoftheworld’saveragelevelrosefrom1.03in1975to19951.94(ArzaghiandHenderson,2005).Atthesametime,endogenousgrowththeoryonnon-traditionalelementstoemphasizethecontributionofeconomicgrowth,toexploretheGovernmentsystemchangesoneconomicgrowthprovidesatheoreticalsupporttopromotedecentralizationandeconomicgrowthonthecorrelationbetweenresearchinthiscontext,recenteconomicgrowthinfiscaldecentralizationpolicyasanewhotresearchfield,nearly10yearstodevelopthesecondgenerationoffiscaldecentralizationtheoryincreasinglyacademicattention.2Accordingtothetraditionaltheoryoffiscaldecentralization,decentralizationoflocalgovernmenttoprovidehelptoincreasetheincentiveoflocalpublicgoods,becausethedecentralizedsystemoflocalgovernmentwithinformationsuperiority,tobetterrespondtothepreferencesoflocalvoters,effectivedeliveryoflocalpublicservices(Tiebout,1956.recentstudiessuggestthat,duetovariousfunctionsofthecompetitionbetweenpublicspendingandalternative,isconducivetothewelfareoflocalresidentsexpenditureonlocalpublicserviceswouldbediverted.QianandRoland(Qian&Roland,1998)thatfiscaldecentralizationwillaffectthecompositionofgovernmentexpenditure,financialinvestmentininfrastructurecompetitionmakesthevalueofthemarginalzoneisgreaterthanthemarginalsocialvalue,sothattheshareofinfrastructurespendingtoincrease,decreaseoflocalpublicgoodsspending.Heine(2006thatliquidityoftheindividualwillhavetheirownexitoptionasabargainingchip,attheexpenseofthepoorliquidityofindividualinterests,askedtheGovernmentto3increasetheproductionofservices.relativetothelargenumberoftheoretical,onthestructureoffiscaldecentralizationonpublicspendingfewstudiesontheimpactofexperience,mostareconcernedabouttheseparationofpowersforacertaincategoryofpublicspendingorperformanceimpact.FuYongandZhangYan(2007foundthatChina’sfiscaldecentralizationofpublicexpenditurestructureofgovernmenthadadistortingeffect,leadingtoculture,lackofeducationalspending.ahypothesistobetestedisthatChina’suniquepoliticalcentralizationanddecentralizationofthefinancialsystemwillbecarriedoutbetweenthelocalgo...