Discretionarydisclosureinthepresenceofdualdistributionchannels全权披露的双重存在分销渠道Aprevailingviewinthedisclosureliteratureisthatfirmswholearnfavorablemarketinformationarereluctanttodiscloseit,fearingitwillattractnewrivals.Inthispaper,wedemonstratethatthepresenceofdualdistributionarrangements,whereinconsumerscanpurchaseproductseitherfromtraditionalretailfirmsordirectlyfromsuppliers,cannotablyalterdisclosureincentives.Asunderprevailingviews,aretailerdisclosingpositivenewsrisksentrybycompetitors.However,entryshiftstheincumbentsupplier–retailerrelationship:thepresenceofnewcompetitorsleadsthesuppliertotreatitsretailermoreasastrategicpartner,translatingintolowerwholesaleprices.This,inturn,canleadtheretailertowillinglysharefavorablenews,sincesuchdisclosureinvitesentrypreciselywhentheretailerstandstobenefitmostfrompriceconcessions.Ourresultssuggestthatasdualdistributioncontinuestoincreaseinprominence,firmsmaybemorewillingtovoluntarilydisclosesensitivefinancialinformationparticularlythatwhichpointstohighdemandforitsproducts.在公开文献中的一个普遍的看法是，企业谁学习有利的市场信息都不愿意透露，担心它会吸引新的竞争者。在本文中，我们证明了双分销安排，其中，消费者可以购买的产品无论是从传统的零售企业，或直接从供应商的存在，能显着改变披露的激励机制。由于根据当时的看法，零售商透露利好消息的风险由竞争者进入市场。然而，进入移动现任供应商-零售商关系：新的竞争对手的存在导致供应商对待它的零售商更作为战略合作伙伴，转化为较低的批发价格。这反过来，可能导致零售商心甘情愿地分享利好消息，因为这样的披露邀请进入恰恰当零售商表示，从价格优惠中受益最多。我们的研究结果表明，作为双重分布继续增加突出，企业可能更愿意自愿披露特别是指向其产品的高需求敏感的财务信息。1.IntroductionFirmsaretypicallyeagertodisclosefavorablefinancialperformancetocapitalmarkets.However,concernthatinformationwillhaveharmfulcompetitiveconsequencescanrestraindisclosures.Thisissueisparticularlypressingforretailfirmsoperatinginacompetitivemarketplace.Thoughfrequentinteractionswithcustomersmayenableretailerstogatherinformationaboutdemandconditions,theirfinancialdisclosuresareoftennotrevealingaboutsalesofindividualproductlinesorevenaboutdemandatthebrand,geographical,orcategorylevel.Theconventionalviewisthatretailersarelessforthcomingwiththisdetailedinformationinordertokeeprivalsandpotentialrivalsastepbehindincompetition.Thisintuitiveperspectiveonthedownsideofdisclosure,labeledthe‘‘proprietarycosthypothesis,’’haspermeatedthetheoreticalliteratureondisclosure(e.g.,Verrecchia(1983),DarroughandStoughton(1990),Wagenhofer(1990),HayesandLundholm1。介绍企业通常急于披露有利的财务表现，资本市场。然而，关注这些信息将有竞争力的有害后果可以抑制披露。这一问题尤为迫切要求在竞争激烈的市场中经营的零售企业。虽然与客户频繁的互动可以使零售商能够收集有关需求状况的信息，他们的财务披露往往没有透露有关销售个别产品线甚至约在品牌，地域或类别层次的需求。传统的观点认为，零售商不太即将与这方面的详细信息，以保持对手和潜在的对手落后一步的竞争。这种直观的角度上披露的缺点，标有'专有成本假说，''已经渗透披露（如Verrecchia（1983），Darrough和斯托顿（1990），Wagenhofer（1990），Hayes和Lundholm理论文献Inthispaperwepresentadifferentviewbydemonstratingwhysomefirmsmaybemorewillingtodisclosenewstopotentialcompetitors.Ourunderlyingpremiseisthatexistingviewsofthecompetitiveeffectsofdisclosurearerootedinstaleviewsofdistributionnetworks.Toelaborate,thetraditionaldistribut...